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STUDENT COMMENTARY
NOT ALL THAT UNFAMILIAR: A COMMENTARY ON
PROFESSOR EPSTEIN'S GENDER IS FOR NOUNS
Last February, at the conference that generated the papers which
comprise this symposium, Professor Richard Epstein noted that the
title of his address, Gender Is for Nouns, is "provocative." His re-
mark hinted at what the attendants hoped: that the address itself
would be provocative in its approach to sex discrimination. At the
conclusion of his address, there was no rush at the refund counter.
Some quarreled with the reasoning of the address; others with its
language. But no one, to my knowledge, disputed its deliciously po-
litically incorrect provocativeness.
It may seem hard to dispute that take on what is now the lead
article in this symposium.' Professor Epstein's arguments strike at
the heart of employment discrimination laws in a way not often
found in the academic debate. But outside the academic debate, the
perspective is gnawingly familiar, not just in the abstract, but for its
resemblance to another polemic on the insertion of biological argu-
ments into the employment discrimination debate: the April 6, 1987,
edition of ABC's "Nightline." Can it be that Professor Epstein (as
he makes his case) is Al Campanis with tenure?
When Al Campanis, formerly a high-ranking executive for the
Los Angeles Dodgers, appeared on "Nightline" in 1987, his remarks
caused a stir that filled the media, shook Major League Baseball to
its foundations, and lead to his resignation. Mr. Campanis, recall,
asserted on national television that blacks "may not have some of
the necessities to be a field manager or general manager."2 "How
many quarterbacks are there?," he quipped. "How many pitch-
ers?" 3 Mr. Campanis graciously conceded that blacks were "very
1. Richard A. Epstein, Gender Is for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981 (1992).
2. Bill Dwyre, Campanis Questions Ability of Blacks, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1987, § 3, at I.
3. Id.
1203
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
God-gifted and wonderful people," possessing "great musculature"
and being "fleet of foot."' 4 But this athletic ability, it seems, was not
universal. Mr. Campanis had earlier in the program answered his
own question: "Why aren't blacks good swimmers? They don't have
buoyancy. '
Not to be outdone, Professor Epstein relies heavily on biological
arguments in his attack on sex discrimination law. The difference
between men's and women's brains,6 the ability of women to carry
milk,7 and the differing reproductive strategies of men and women8
are all enlisted as reasons not to be surprised, upset, or called to
(state) action over sex discrimination. "Any regularities in percep-
tion that arise by this indirect and diffuse process are far more relia-
ble, and should be accorded greater weight, than an explicit formal
pronouncement of the state or any of its agencies."9 Where, Mr.
Campanis must think, was Professor Epstein when I needed him.
Two questions arise: First, do Mr. Campanis' statements garner
the protection of Professor Epstein's arguments? In other words, are
they in a sense speaking the same language? Second, if the perspec-
tives are similar, as I argue, what light does this shed on the debate
that Professor Epstein's article engenders?
Professor Epstein might initially respond to the comparison of his
analysis to the remarks of Al Campanis by noting the distinction
between race and sex .discrimination. The sexes more often than the
races differ in ways that are relevant to employment decisions, he
might argue. 10 Title VII itself, after all, treats race discrimination
more seriously than it does sex discrimination.1
Enlisting such distinctions between sex and race discrimination,
however, would violate the ground rules Professor Epstein has set.
4. Id.
5. Id. Mr. Campanis publicly apologized for the remarks. Campanis Apologizes for His Ra-
cial Remarks, WASH. POST. Apr. 8, 1987, at B2.
6. Epstein, supra note 1, at 988-89.
7. Id. at 990.
8. Id. at 992-93.
9. Id. at 984.
10. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIs-
CRIMINATION 269-74 (1992).
II. Intentional sex discrimination, unlike race discrimination, is excusable for a bona fide occu-
pational qualification. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 280-81,
283-312. Furthermore, victims of intentional race discrimination are afforded the broad remedies
of section 1981 actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). More limited remedies are
available to victims of intentional sex discrimination under Title VII as amended by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Id. § 1981a (Supp. III 1991).
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Should we let the market determine which distinctions are rational
or are we going to bar some distinctions through law? If the answer
is, as Professor Epstein argues, Let the market work it through, then
race-based assumptions may sometimes appear as rational as sex-
based assumptions.
Where would these race-based assumptions appear in the absence
of antidiscrimination laws? That is to a large extent unpredictable.
But there is data that could be enlisted to justify assumptions. The
disparity in IQ test scores among the races12 seems to be a natural
place for employers to start. At the point at which testing is costlier
than being wrong some of the time, the assumption that a person
possesses his or her race's average IQ test score (or strength or level
of responsibility) is economically rational.
Other assumptions, as a matter of logic, might be validated. If
one were to establish race-based averages in different catego-
ries-whatever they might be-some race would be first, some race
would be last, and the rest would be in the middle. And the validity
of the assumptions, Professor Epstein must conclude, should be
tested in the market.
Nor do these racial assumptions necessarily depend upon the ugli-
est of assertions: innate genetic inferiority. Professor Epstein is as-
serting that a "confluence of separate pressures"13 are responsible
for different employment skills in the sexes. Perhaps holders of the
Campanis point of view would ground their assertions not in some
notion of inherent inferiority, but in the notion that situations and
choices-a "confluence of separate pressures "-have rewarded and
punished different mental and physical skills among the races. Al
Campanis' view of employment decision making appears to fit in
well with the structure of Professor Epstein's arguments.
What light, then, does this comparison of sex to race and of Pro-
fessor Epstein's statements to those of Al Campanis shed on the de-
bate? In short, the remarks of Mr. Campanis are what we as a na-
tion have to look forward to if Professor Epstein's provocative ideas
become repealing legislation, except that the assurance that federal
law seeks to prevent those remarks from becoming either explicit or
12. Andrew Hacker, The Myths of Racial Division, NEw REPUBLIC. Mar. 23, 1992, at 21, 22.
Hacker, it is important to emphasize, acknowledges that unexplained disparities exist, but rejects
the disparities as ultimately irrelevant race differences. Id. at 22, 24.
13. Epstein, supra note 1, at 984.
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implicit policy will be removed."' Reliance on race- and sex-based
assumptions will be tested in the market, not the courts. Professor
Epstein has not just acknowledged this regarding sex-based assump-
tions; he has applauded it. As an eighty-one-game fan of the mar-
ket, it would be disingenuous of him to make such bold assertions
regarding sex-based patterns, and back off on the subject of race-
based patterns. The comparison forces the moment to its crisis: Is
sex discrimination to be taken as seriously as race discrimination?
Does sex discrimination have the ugly history and ability to tear the
nation apart that race discrimination has? If so, then biological ar-
guments have as much place in the sex discrimination debate as
they do in the race discrimination debate.
Perhaps the use of statistics in employment discrimination suits
has gotten out of hand; 15 perhaps the concept of bona fide occupa-
tional qualification has been interpreted away so as to be useless;'"
and perhaps the antidiscrimination principle cannot sustain both a
ban on discrimination and an approval of private affirmative ac-
tion. 7 But the notion of the federal government abandoning the po-
sition that private employment discrimination is-in the main-Big
W wrong is disconcerting. The normative message of the Civil
Rights Act must remain.
The first generation that was born into a country which had
adopted that norm is now just beginning to work, teach, and raise
families of its own. That generation has benefitted from the condem-
nation of private employment discrimination, from the knowledge
that the statements of Al Campanis violated not only personal
morals, but collective morals as well. At least part of the value of
the original 1964 Civil Rights Act lies in the expression of that
norm at a vital moment in United States history. I, like Professor
Epstein, think we should be "extremely cautious"' 8 in these matters,
but extremely cautious in deciding that the vital moment has
14. Admittedly, professional baseball may be an inappropriate example with which to challenge
Professor Epstein, as its monopoly status complicates' the analysis. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at
79-87 (acknowledging that monopoly status may warrant antidiscrimination regulation, but con-
cluding that "no private employer in any industry has anything close to the level of monopoly
power that justifies the use of the antidiscrimination principle"). The purpose here, however, is not
to work the specific example completely through the analysis, but to illustrate what biological
arguments look like when applied to race.
15. Id. at 205-41.
16. Id. at 283-312.
17. Id. at 395-438.
18. Epstein, supra note I, at 984.
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passed.
"We" categorically disagree with Professor Epstein in matters of
sex, reads the Civil Rights Act-just as "we" categorically disagree
with Al Campanis in matters of race. Differences, for those keeping
score, are easy to document; but differences need not drive public
policy. The differences among us will always reveal themselves. The
happy irony of being united in defiance of those differences tearing
us apart, however, should remain codified in the Civil Rights Act.
Patrick D. Hughes

